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Since 2003, the annual Marx and Philosophy Conference in London has been a showcase for original 
research in Marxist philosophy. Jan Kandiyali’s Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy, like 
its predecessor, Andrew Chitty and Martin McIvor’s Karl Marx and Contemporary Philosophy (2009), 
curates a selection of essays developed predominantly from presentations at these events. Its twelve 
chapters represent more than a series of individual contributions. They are a document of a milieu of 
discussion around the Marx and Philosophy Society from 2012-2016. The aim of this latest volume is 
to provide a ‘major re-evaluation of historical issues in Marx scholarship and to connect Marx’s ideas 
with fresh debates in contemporary Anglo-American social and political philosophy’ (i). 
 The collection is divided into four parts, covering Marx’s predecessors, the theme of freedom 
and recognition, the relation between Marx and liberalism, and, finally, Marx’s conception of 
communism. It offers an insightful window into the way in which Marx’s thought continues to inspire 
innovative contributions to philosophical debates. Hegel appears as a frequent protagonist in the 
volume that reaffirms Hegelianism as a key ‘frame of reference’ for Marx’s intellectual development. 
There is a stimulating tension in the book between those contributors who advocate elements of 
Hegel’s thought as a corrective to the deficiencies of Marx’s positions, and others who regard Marx’s 
thought as enriching a Hegelian perspective with a more ambitious transformational project. We can 
discern a comparable conversation with regard to Marx’s relation to liberal thought, with some 
authors (Moggach, Schmidt am Busch, Neuhouser) looking to incorporate a ‘positive role’ for liberal 
rights and ideals in a modified Marxian political philosophy, while others seek to re-articulate Marx’s 
critique of liberalism. While some contributors reconstruct closely the textual argument of Marx and 
Hegel (Chitty), others use these philosophical positions as components to create their own 
constructions (e.g. Reiman’s ‘Marxian Liberalism’). Kandiyali’s introduction supplies a helpful 
summary that draws out the key themes in the book, including Marx’s debts to and differences with 
Hegel, the intersections of Marxian thought and liberalism, and the unexpectedly utopian aspects of 
the young Marx’s vision of a good life. 
 The first section on Marx’s predecessors, covering classical German philosophy, the Young 
Hegelians and the Utopian socialists, is effective in placing Marx’s thought in the context of his 
intellectual sparring partners. Moggach explores the post-Kantian perfectionist project—those, like 
Schiller, Fichte and Hegel, who sought to overcome the impediments to freedom—and argues that 
Marx’s mixed inheritance shares more of this project with his Left-Hegelian contemporaries than 
previously acknowledged. Moggach contends that Marx’s merits stem mainly from his retention of 
this idealist heritage. For his part, Renault focuses our attention on the historical and logical 
distinctions between the Left Hegelians and the Young Hegelians. Renault reconstructs Marx’s 
participation in these polemics over Hegel’s legacy, characterizing him as ‘a Left Hegelian of a Young 
Hegelian type’ (52). Thus, Renault corrects the view of the Young Hegelians as peripheral figures in 
Marx’s development, revealing Marx’s criticisms of Hegel as deeply indebted to them. Leopold 
provides substance to a triumvirate of Utopian socialists, Fourier, Saint-Simon and Owen, rescuing 
these figures from a frequently schematic treatment in the literature. Leopold’s reading enables a 
nuanced assessment of Marxian positions, de-reifying the traditional opposition between scientific 




 The second part engages with the theme of recognition in Marx and Hegel, and the latter’s 
concept of ‘concrete freedom’. Ikäheimo finds affinities between the programmes of Hegel and Marx. 
At the same time, Ikäheimo argues that Marx’s discussion of truly human freedom in his ‘Comments 
on James Mill’ lacks elements of Hegel’s conception of concrete freedom. According to Ikäheimo, 
Hegel’s multi-dimensional account of recognition and personhood can supplement Marx’s treatment 
of a non-alienated way of life. This should be understood not as an ‘abstract freedom’, but as a way 
of life embedded in norms and institutions that establish truly human roles and relationships that are 
concretely free. Schmidt am Busch pursues this theme, investigating Hegel’s relation to liberal rights. 
While both Marx and Hegel conceive of freedom as ‘being at one with oneself in the other’, Schmidt 
am Busch contrasts Marx’s conception of ‘free life-activity’ with Hegel’s account of the freedom of 
persons. For Hegel, the role of abstract right is ambivalent. It is key to the realization of modern 
freedom, whilst simultaneously promoting economic conditions that undermine it. For his part, Marx 
rejects abstract right entirely, without developing an institutional alternative that recognizes and 
protects human capacities. Schmidt am Busch frames Honneth’s recent work on social freedom as an 
attempt to find a middle road between these positions. Chitty’s investigation of human solidarity 
provides an instructive textual elaboration of the forms of self-awareness in Hegel’s philosophy of 
spirit, and the contradictions driving the inner dynamic of these forms. Chitty identifies 
correspondences between the structure of Marx’s conception of human emancipation, as becoming 
‘species-beings’, and Hegel’s account of the development of universal self-consciousness. While, for 
Chitty, Hegel’s derivation has more explanatory depth, he finds that Marx’s reasoning lends itself more 
easily to a wider treatment of ‘human’ solidarity. 
 In the third section on Marx’s relation to liberalism, Neuhouser considers Marx’s critique of 
the ‘bourgeois’ ideals of freedom, equality and justice. He argues that capitalist society’s failure to 
realize these ideals leaves room for a normative commitment to them in an alternative Marxian vision. 
Failing to develop such a conception stems, for Neuhouser, from Marx’s insufficiently Hegelian 
approach to the question of ideals. Marx thus neglects to provide a socially-protected space for 
individuals to pursue their chosen ends. Reiman addresses the impasse reached by Rawlsian thought 
through its combination with Marxian beliefs. He argues for a form of Marxian Liberalism that 
displaces ownership from its foundational position, e.g. in Left-Libertarianism. Thus, Reiman 
advocates a ‘just state’ that protects the right to liberty while minimizing social subjugation. 
Sypnowich provides an illuminating tour of different forms of egalitarianism, e.g. Dworkin’s ‘luck 
egalitarianism’, Rawls’s argument for redistribution, and their influence on Cohen and others. She 
argues for the elaboration of a renewed socialist vision of justice. This involves questioning the 
neutralist orthodoxy of contemporary (left-)liberal egalitarianism and a return to a more substantial 
conception of human flourishing. 
 In the fourth section, Brudney provides a close analysis of two elements of Marx’s thought: 
his theory of alienation and what Brudney calls Marx’s Linkage Thesis—that under communism, ‘the 
free development of each is the condition of the free development of all’ (211). Brudney delineates 
different ways of reading these ideas, and reconstructs them using the terminology of Rawls, Mill and 
Kant. Like Reiman, Brudney aims to develop a Marxian view adequate for the 21st century. For 
Brudney, this means reducing Marx’s commitment to productivism—including the Lockean view of 
self-ownership, and the claim that ‘human beings are essentially material producers’ (218). It also 
means understanding the Linkage Thesis in a normative way. Kandiyali’s contribution reprises the 
consideration of Marx’s influences, arguing for a greater commonality between the ideas of Schiller 
and Marx than suggested by superficial appearances. In particular, Kandiyali examines their respective 
treatments of the deleterious effects of specialization in modern life. While contrasting Schiller’s 
solution to this problem, aesthetic education, with Marx’s emphasis on social change, Kandiyali seeks 
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to underline their shared commitment to ‘an uncompromising form of ethical individualism that 
denies that collective flourishing can come at the expense of individual self-realization’ (250). Finally, 
Sayers discusses the return of the ‘idea of communism’ as a response to the prolonged crisis 
experienced by capitalism in the last decade. He considers the work of Alain Badiou, and the 
conception of history as an ‘aleatory’ process developed by recent French philosophy. Sayers rejects 
the emphasis on detachment that he finds in Badiou’s ruptural notion of the Event, defending a 
conception of Marxism that is both dialectical and deterministic in its account of the interaction 
between change and continuity in history. 
 These readings of Marx (and Engels) are weighted towards a consideration of works written 
in the early 1840s, where Marx formulates the philosophical aspects of his thought most explicitly. 
This is understandable due to the contributors’ shared focus on reading Marx philosophically. A wider 
reassessment of Marx’s social and political philosophy could perhaps have engaged further with those 
studying Marx’s later work (e.g. Jameson 2011, Callinicos 2014), and, more specifically, with 
elaborating the precise nature of the philosophical themes that persist there. Contributors may also 
have benefitted from bringing their significant deployment of Anglo-American thought (Rawls, 
Dworkin, Cohen, etc.) into dialogue with global social theory (e.g. post- and decolonial readings of 
Marx including Spivak 1999, Amin 2009, Banaji 2010, Chibber 2013, Harootunian 2015). This might 
have complemented efforts by contributors to consider the 21st-century context of Marx’s thought 
with respect to gender (Sypnowich), social reproduction, and disability (Brudney). Overall, this volume 
will be of great value to scholars and advanced students interested in recent debates in Marxist 
philosophy. By providing a survey of this upswing in research on Marx, drawing connections with Hegel 
scholarship and Anglo-American philosophy, it makes an important contribution towards revivifying 
the significant resources that the Marxian toolbox can provide to contemporary critical thought. 
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